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THE ROLE OF CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINES IN
HEALTH CARE REFORM
Arnold J. Rosofft
I. INTRODUCTION
AFTER A YEAR'S HIATUS, the push for national health
care reform has again risen to national prominence. Leading
the charge this time is the "Republican Revolution" and its de-
sire to reduce federal spending on "entitlements," starting with
the reform of Medicare, then moving on to revisions in Medi-
caid and, finally, in private health insurance. Despite the fervor
and momentum of GOP reformers, major revisions to federal
health care programs are far from assured. But, no matter
what happens in the congressional arena, reforms will still take
place around the country. Several states have cost containment
and cost-effectiveness programs in progress or under considera-
tion, and countless initiatives are under way in the private sec-
tor. At every level, Americans are committed to getting more
for the resources we expend on health care..
Figuring prominently in this picture is an increasing inter-
est in and reliance upon "Clinical Practice Guidelines"
(CPGs), also known by a variety of other terms: "practice pa-
rameters," "critical pathways," "clinical algorithms," and the
like.' The use of CPGs is an approach widely believed to have
substantial potential to contain the cost as well as to assure the
quality of medical services. But this innovation, strongly fa-
vored in some circles, evokes concern and reservation in others.
CPGs are the subject of much debate, both as to their concep-
t Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, and Senior Fellow, The Leonard
Davis Institute of Health Economics and Health Care Systems, University of Pennsylvania.
1. The American Medical Association prefers the term "parameters" to "guide-
lines," believing the former to be less prescriptive. Edward Hirshfeld, Should Practice Pa-
rameters Be the Standard of Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2887
(1991).
HEALTH MATRIX
tual and scientific validity and as to their practical, financial,
and legal implications for the professional practice of medicine
and the organization and delivery of health services. This Arti-
cle reviews the development of the CPG movement and assesses
its implications for health care reform at all levels, emphasizing
the legal significance of CPGs and, in particular, their use in
medical malpractice litigation.
II. WHAT ARE CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES?
Put simply, clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are sets of
suggestions, commonly set forth as decision rules, that reflect
informed opinion on how to treat a certain illness or condition.
CPGs are generally derived from scientific studies comparing
the effectiveness of various clinical approaches to treating a
particular medical situation. The Institute of Medicine has de-
fined CPGs as "systematically developed statements to assist
practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care
for specific clinical circumstances."2 Professor Troyen A. Bren-
nan describes them as "standardized specifications for care, ei-
ther for using a procedure or for managing a particular clinical
problem." Whatever their specific form, CPGs are intended to
point the way toward higher quality and more cost-effective
care by making readily accessible the clinical knowledge dis-
tilled from outcomes research.
CPGs can differ substantially, however, depending upon
their auspice and purpose." Most current interest focuses on
their use as cost-containment measures by health plans of vari-
ous types. Brennan distinguishes "'standard of care' guide-
lines," which are intended to improve outcomes, from "'appro-
priateness' guidelines," which are oriented toward cost-
2. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A
NEW PROGRAM 8 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990) [hereinafter CPG
DIRECTIONS].
3. Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or
Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 67, 67 (1991). See also Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome Measurement and Prac-
tice Standards, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 368, 375 (1990) (providing an overview of
the various forms CPGs may take).
4. For example, CPGs may be developed to assure quality of care, to reduce ineffi-
cient utilization, or to maximize profits of third-party payors. See John Ayres, The Use and
Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 421, 436-38 (1994).
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effectiveness." In other words, CPGs can be principally "qual-
ity-enhancing" or "cost-reducing" - recognizing that in some
happy situations a CPG-defined protocol can both improve
quality and contain cost. For the most part, however, these two
objectives are a trade-off, and the current enthusiasm for CPGs
is largely driven by the desire for cost containment. The pri-
mary objective is to shift practice patterns toward more cost-
effective treatment; quality becomes a consideration only in
that no one wants to let it suffer unduly - whatever that
means - in the process.
III. THE PROMISE OF CPGs
As a beginning matter, CPGs clearly have the potential to
both improve the quality and help contain the cost of health
care. A large and well-documented body of evidence - typified
by the work of John Wennberg at Dartmouth - reveals signifi-
cant, even substantial, variations in clinical practice patterns
from one region to another, and even from one institution to
another in the same locale.6 Procedures commonly used in one
place may not be used much in another, hospital lengths of stay
differ widely, and there are numerous other differences that
cannot be justified or, in some cases, even explained. This ob-
served variation in practice approaches implies either that prac-
titioners do not really know what works in medicine and, so,
are just "firing blind," or else that some do know what works
and are doing it right while others, for some reason, are not.
The challenge, of course, is determining what works best and
guiding practitioners to adopt and use therapeutic approaches
which have a proven ability to deliver a good result.
Increasingly, modern medical science can determine
through clinical outcomes and effectiveness research, what is
5. Brennan, supra note 3, at 70.
6. See generally John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A
Proposal for Action, HEALTH Am., Summer 1984, at 6 (documenting variations in use
rates for medical treatments and surgical procedures); John E. Wennberg et al., Profes-
sional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-Induced Demand, 16 Soc. Sci. MED. 811,
812-17 (1982) (reviewing variations in surgical practices). See also Mark R. Chassin et al.,
Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare Population, 314
NEw ENG. J. MED. 285, 287 (1986) (listing rates of use among medicare beneficiaries by
degree of variation); David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncer-
tainty, HEALTH Asp., Fall 1984, at 74, 77-80 (explaining the variations in making a diag-
nosis and selecting a procedure).
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the better approach for certain kinds of cases and treatments.
With more powerful computer technology and more and better
treatment data with which to work, our ability to undertake
discriminating analysis of how care is rendered and what the
results of that care are is greatly enhanced. We can determine
what care is truly effective and what is not. David Eddy, M.D.,
of Duke University, is one of the leaders in outcomes research;7
but many other individuals and groups are also contributing to
the rapidly advancing science of medical decision making.'
Not only can we determine what works well and what does
not; we also can expand the analysis to consider the costs of the
care rendered and thus assess which treatment approaches are
cost-effective and which are not. Some tests and procedures,
despite adding cost, do nothing to improve outcomes and can
be dismissed as worthless. Others may improve the probability
of achieving a desired clinical outcome, but not at a substantial
enough rate to dictate that they must be used. In this latter
case, the hard choice arises of whether the added benefit is
worth the added cost.
To use a concrete example, consider the use of the newer
drug TPA instead of the older medicine, Streptokinase, to treat
heart attacks. Assuming that TPA is one percent more effective
- that is, it will save one person in one hundred that Strepto-
kinase would not - and that it costs two thousand dollars
more per patient to use, the total cost of saving each patient is
$200,000.00.' Saving the life of just one hundred more heart
attack victims per year using TPA would add twenty million
dollars in annual cost to the nation's health care system. At the
societal, or "macro," level is it "worth" twenty million dollars
7. See, e.g., David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From Theory to Practice
(pts. 1-4), 263 JAMA 287, 441, 877, 1265 (1990).
8. For an introduction to this field, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S,
CONGRESS, OTA-H-608, IDENTIFYING HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES THAT WORK: SEARCHING
FOR EVIDENCE 145-47 (1994); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical
Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 777, 777 (1990); William L. Roper et al.,
Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice,
319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198 (1988).
The emerging science of outcomes research has spawned a variety of professional or-
ganizations, such as the Society for Medical Decisionmaking, based at George Washington
University, which publishes a quarterly journal, Medical Decisionmaking. Other publica-
tions recently joining this veteran include The Journal of Outcomes Management.
9. The cost figures used in this example are just rough estimates used to illustrate
the general concept.
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annually to save one hundred more lives? Outcomes research
and cost-effectiveness studies, and the CPGs developed from
them, cannot make these hard choices for us. They only allow
us to make them more knowledgeably and thus, one would
hope, make them smarter and better. But in this context
"smarter and better" does not necessarily mean easier and with
less pain. Hard choices can sometimes be more difficult and
painful to make when done with eyes wide open, with full
knowledge of the consequences. Moreover, framing the issue
this way implies that we could, if we chose, provide TPA treat-
ment to all who might benefit by it. That, of course, is not the
case. In a very real sense, our society is bumping up against the
sharp edges of what we can afford to do.
IV. CPGs: A RECENT HISTORY
Although CPGs have been around, in various forms, for
much longer, the last half-decade or so has seen a dramatic
increase in the attention given to them. Federal legislation, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA '89), cre-
ated the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR) within the Public Health Service, a subdivision of
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and
assigned to it the responsibility for the Department's "Medical
Treatment Effectiveness Program."10 This program's purpose,
and AHCPR's charge, was to support research, data develop-
ment, and other activities to "arrange for the development and
periodic review and updating of clinically relevant guidelines,
standards of quality, performance measures, and medical re-
view criteria""u and to "enhance the quality, appropriateness,
and effectiveness of health care services,""' not just for federal
health programs but more broadly. AHCPR's functions include
fostering public-private enterprise to develop, disseminate, and
evaluate CPGs, largely through its "Forum for Quality and Ef-
fectiveness in Health Care."' 3 Continuing the strong academic
orientation of its predecessor organization, the National Center
10. See Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6103, 103 Stat. 2189 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 299 (Supp. V 1993)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-1(a).
12. Id. § 299b.
13. Id. § 299b-1.
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for Health Services Research (NCHSR), AHCPR's work is, in
many respects, more focused on expanding knowledge than on
applying it. A big part of that activity is methodologic: study-
ing, developing, and refining the process for generating practice
guidelines and assuring their regular updating and revision. An
important policy question, addressed later in this Article,1 ' is
whether AHCPR's destiny is to be the sole official generator of
CPGs, a government facilitator to foster their development by
others, the official body for reviewing and certifying CPGs -
the "blessing" function, as it has been called by some - either
for use in governmental health programs or more broadly, or
some combination of the above or other functions.
V. PROVIDERS' REACTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE
Reflecting their current prime purpose of cost-contain-
ment, CPGs are finding their greatest use in managed care set-
tings, including HMOs, PPOs, and other entities with a stake
in fostering the cost-conscious and cost-effective use of health
services. Adherence to CPGs, at some level at least, may be a
condition of participation for physicians and other providers
joining HMOs or other cost-constrained health plans. In some
cases, providers may be told explicitly upon joining that the
plan's CPGs are a key part of the "rules of the game" and they
must either follow the CPGs or take some special action to jus-
tify deviation in a particular situation. In other cases, CPGs
are a less apparent part of the plan's supervisory infrastructure,
a fact that becomes known to the doctor over time as the plan
agrees or refuses to authorize certain kinds of care in given
circumstances.15
14. See infra part VI.B.2.
15. The different uses for CPGs relates to the earlier discussion of terminology. See
supra text accompanying notes 2-5. For example, some commentators have recognized a
distinction between advisory and prescriptive guidelines, using the terms "boundary" and
"pathway" guidelines. "Boundary guidelines are used by payers to define a range of prac-
tice options within which physicians could act without incurring financial or other sanc-
tions. Pathway guidelines are employed primarily by providers and serve as a beacon for
clinical practice and a standard around which practice patterns should converge." Havig-
hurst, supra note 8, at 778 (citing Lewin & Erickson, LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PRAcTIcE GUIDELINES: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS 3 (pre-
pared for the Physician Payment Review Commission's Conference on Practice Guidelines,
Washington, D.C., Oct. 11, 1988) (revised April 24, 1989). A useful discussion of the
interaction between the semantics of CPGs and concerns about the use to which they will
374 [Vol. 5:369
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One of the things that has affected how key stakeholders
view CPGs is the above-mentioned variability in their auspice,
orientation, and purpose.'6 Some who supported the guidelines
movement in its earlier stages, when the focus was on quality
enhancement, are not inclined to be supportive now that the
focus has changed. There are several reasons for this retreat,
some of which revolve around the role and independence of the
physician.
The goal of effectiveness studies and CPGs is not, despite
what some physicians may believe, to remove all elements of
discretion and professional judgment from medical care. There
will always be the need - and, one would hope, the latitude -
for the exercise of professional judgment.'7 Still, as the body of
what is knowable and what is known grows, the degree of lati-
tude will inevitably be impacted by the extant knowledge base.
When one does not know what is right or wrong, everything is
fair game to do. Knowledge brings limitations, or at least, the
basis for limitations to be imposed. As an Institute of Medicine
committee on Practice Guidelines has stated, the formal recog-
nition of the practice guidelines movement "can be seen as part
of a significant cultural shift, a move away from unexamined
reliance on professional judgment toward more structured sup-
port and accountability for such judgment.""8 This last obser-
vation suggests an important reason many physicians tend to
resist the CPG movement. As professionals do generally, physi-
cians fear reduction of their practice autonomy and indepen-
dent judgment: both things they prize greatly. Moreover, just
as physicians do not want to give up autonomy, they also may
be concerned about the potential for guidelines to freeze the
state of medical knowledge and practice by trying to direct
what is "the right thing" to do.
be put can be found in Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in
Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 120 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Ed Hirshfeld, Use of Practice Parameters as Standards of Care and in
Health Care Reform: A View from the American Medical Association, 19 J. ON QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT 322, 323 (1993) (explaining why the AMA believes that CPGs should not
be mandatory but should instead be used as a source of evidence for the appropriate stan-
dard of care).
17. Id. See also Havighurst, supra note 8, at 778 (stating that CPGs should be advi-
sory only).
18. CPG DIRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
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There are other possible explanations for physicians' antip-
athy toward CPGs. First, some physicians simply may not be-
lieve in their validity. While, as scientists, physicians have a
high regard for empirical proof generally, at times they may
tend to weight their own clinical experience and personal obser-
vations over general statistics. Physicians also may have reason-
ably grounded doubts about the applicability of a CPG to the
particular situation they are currently facing. CPGs, by their
nature, are generalizations that do not necessarily apply in a
given instance.
Physicians' attitudes toward CPGs also may be driven by
a cautious solicitude for the welfare of their patients. Physi-
cians know that in some cases guidelines may be used to limit
treatment options or deny payment on a cost-benefit rationale
for care they believe their patients' welfare requires, regardless
of the cost. Intertwined with that concern is another, more self-
protective motivation. In an era of widespread medical mal-
practice litigation, physicians are wary of anything that could
pressure them to provide a lesser degree of care if so doing
might expose them to liability. This results in the phenomenon
known as the defensive practice of medicine, to which extensive
study and comment have been directed. 19 Although physicians'
fears of being sued when they render less than the maximum
care possible in a particular treatment situation may be out of
proportion to the actual risk they face, those fears still greatly
influence what physicians do.20
Another important hindrance to the development of a con-
stituency for widespread use of CPGs, especially within the
medical community, is the uncertainty as to how the law will
come to treat them in cases challenging the quality of health
care. Will they be a relatively neutral addition to the legal
19. See, e.g., Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (examining the
effects of liability concerns on physician practice patterns); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY IN THE '80's, REPORT 1, at 16-20 (1984) (estimating the total cost of defensive
medicine to be $15.1 billion annually); Hall, supra note 15; Laurence R. Tancredi & Jer-
emiah H. Barondess, The Problem of Defensive Medicine, 200 SCIENCE 879 (1978) (re-
viewing the limited data and studies on defensive medicine).
20. Just as physicians' concerns about malpractice suits may be somewhat excessive,
there is nothing approaching definitive evidence that the practice of defensive medicine is
as prevalent as the medical profession believes it to be. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 72,
and sources there cited; see also sources cited supra note 19.
[Vol. 5:369
1995] THE ROLE OF CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES 3-/I
landscape or will they, as some fear, be an additional goad to
and support for legal challenges against health care providers?
This fear has affected and will continue to affect the way in
which the CPG movement evolves. Conversely, the direction
this evolution takes will determine the reaction and response of
the health care community.
VI. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF USING CPGs IN
PRACTICE
What will be the application and effect of guidelines in
suits against providers who do or do not follow them? This is a
complex, interesting, and practically important question that
turns on several factors: (1) Who developed the guideline in
question, and how was it developed? (2) Did a designated gov-
ernment body (state or federal) certify, endorse, or "bless" the
guideline? (3) Is there only one guideline for the condition or
treatment in question, or are there multiple, competing guide-
lines? And finally, (4) who is asserting the guideline in court
- e.g., the plaintiff or defendant - and for what purpose?
These factors will be examined in greater depth later, but first
let us consider the variety of ways that courts can treat and
apply CPGs in a litigation setting.
A. How Will CPGs be Applied in Malpractice Litigation?
The following is a brief overview of the ways that courts
could treat CPGs in the context of medical malpractice litiga-
tion. This enumeration, sufficient for the present analysis, is not
exhaustive. While most of the states are largely similar with
regard to their definitions of medical negligence and the evi-
dentiary requirements for proving and rebutting malpractice
claims, there are also significant differences. The treatment of
CPGs obviously will depend upon the underlying legal terrain.
Following this same reasoning, the categories below are not
mutually exclusive; a given court could adopt more than one
treatment of CPGs, depending upon the particular case and the
way it was presented.
This part of the analysis builds upon state law foundations
and makes the implicit working assumption that the role of
CPGs will be determined as a matter of state law. Given the
possibility of national health care reform - however unlikely it
may seem to some - this developmental path is not inevitable.
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If there is federal health care reform legislation, an important
and interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, is
whether the federal government could impose any of the CPG
approaches on the states.2 1 Medical malpractice law has histor-
ically been a state law matter, not subject to federal control.
This tradition is true of tort law generally and, in fact, is true
of most health care and health insurance regulation. The divi-
sion of authority and responsibility for financing, providing,
and regulating health care involves weighty constitutional ques-
tions of states' rights and separation of powers.21 It also argua-
bly implicates several important federal statutory schemes, in-
cluding the McCarran-Ferguson Act,23  the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),24 and the federal
antitrust laws.2 5 Setting these complications aside for the pre-
sent discussion, state courts might use CPGs in one or more of
the following ways.
1. As Evidence of Customary Practice
The most obvious possibility, and the one most consistent
with current legal conventions, is that a court could view a
21. See generally Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health
Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489
(1994) (outlining the constitutional problems with federal commands to the states).
22. The core issue is the potential conflict between the power to regulate interstate
commerce granted to Congress under Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution and the
sovereign rights reserved to the states under the 10th Amendment. Given the impact on
interstate commerce that medical malpractice litigation can cause, can the federal govern-
ment legitimately impose innovative tort law doctrine on the states? While federal preemp-
tion of the field - i.e., taking the control of malpractice suits away from the states entirely
- would be controversial enough, it is a more complex question whether the federal gov-
ernment can leave such litigation to the states but dictate what liability determining rules
they must apply. This controversy is especially true if these rules would make the state's
judicial processes more difficult and costly. These issues are explored by Professor Hoke,
see supra note 21, at 558-59 (discussing the problems that the states may encounter in
implementing federal malpractice reform proposals).
A related issue, which Professor Hoke also addresses, is whether resolution of the ju-
risdictional dilemma may lie within the "spending power" of Congress, granted under Arti-
cle I, § 8, cl. I of the Constitution. Id. at 571-72. If Congress were to enact some form of
national health care or health insurance system, the provision of federal money to the
states thereunder could provide the nexus for broader federal control of state action.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988) (regulating the business of insurance to the ex-
tent it is not regulated by the states).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (regulating employee benefit plans).
25. Relevant antitrust laws include the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988); the Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988); and the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988).
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CPG as evidence - perhaps highly or even conclusive evidence
- of the customary practice in the medical profession. Thus a
doctor who practiced in conformity with a CPG would be
shielded from liability to the same extent as one who can estab-
lish that she or he followed professional custom. In most juris-
dictions and in most circumstances, adherence to prevalent pro-
fessional standards is an adequate defense to a claim of
medical negligence.26
To a court taking this approach to CPGs, the guideline
would serve roughly the same function as a well-qualified ex-
pert witness. It would inform the court as to the professional
consensus and standard practice, which would be a welcome
and valuable contribution. By providing the court with objec-
tive, neutral, and highly credible evidence of the standard of
care, CPGs would help to counter current dissatisfaction with
the quality of expert testimony on scientific issues.2 7 Brennan
suggests that guidelines will initially be used along with expert
testimony, essentially playing the role of very important review
articles.28
In courts treating CPGs as evidence of professional cus-
tom, the auspice of a guideline should be very significant in
determining the weight to be given to it. A hierarchy of author-
ity and influence readily suggests itself. For example, CPGs is-
sued by a well-regarded professional body, such as the Ameri-
can College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) would
presumably carry more weight than CPGs issued by an
HMO.29 CPGs issued by the federal AHCPR would likely be
more influential than those issued by ACOG. In fact, the au-
26. The classic exception to this general principle is Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981
(Wash. 1974) (holding that, while professional custom is highly persuasive as to what is
reasonable care, it does not wholly determine the legal standard to be applied). Helling has
been followed in only a small number of cases. See, e.g., Lundahl v. Rockford Mem. Hosp.
Ass'n, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239
N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y. 1968).
27. Brennan, supra note 3, at 73. See also Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic
Torts, 51 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1 (1989); Jack B. Weinstein, Litigation and Statistics, 3 STAT.
Sci. 286 (1988); Milton R. Wessel, Adversary Science and the Adversary Scientist:
Threats to Responsible Dispute'Resolution, 28 JURIMETRicS 379, 380-81 (1988) (explain-
ing why society is disillusioned with "the battle of the experts").
28. Brennan, supra note 3, at 74.
29. Professor Mehlman has advocated that the only appropriate auspice is a nation-
ally recognized group if CPGs are to assume the proper level of importance. Mehlman,
supra note 3, at 377. See also Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Stan-
379
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thoritative status of AHCPR-generated guidelines might be
prescribed by federal law. The party offering the CPG would
qualify the guideline much as one would qualify an expert wit-
ness or a learned treatise.30 Of course, if a set of guidelines is
well enough known or issued from a sufficiently prestigious and
credible auspice, a court might simply take "judicial notice" of
the CPG without having to qualify it more specifically as a reli-
able source of accurate information.$'
A key problem exists in treating CPGs as evidence of pro-
fessional custom, however. In the case of a newly developed
CPG, the treatment approach it calls for may differ, perhaps
substantially, from prevailing practice in the relevant field.32
This disparity is particularly likely when cost-reducing guide-
lines have evolved from studies concluding that the conven-
tional practice "overtreats" the patient, wasting resources with-
out yielding discernible or sufficient benefit by improving
treatment outcomes. Over time, if the guideline is widely
adopted and followed by the medical community, it will in-
creasingly become a statement of the customary practice. In
the interim, however, the guideline may reflect just the oppo-
site, a statement of what the profession at large does not cur-
rently do.33
dard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C.
DAVis L. REV. 421, 448 (1989).
30. Various commentators have reasoned that courts will allow CPGs in evidence
under the "learned treatise" exception to the hearsay rule. Brennan, supra note 3, at 75;
Kinney & Wilder, supra note 29.
31. Mehlman, supra note 3, at 378 (proposing that courts presume that the national
standards from reputable medical organizations be used to establish the minimum legal
standard); Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard
of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL L. REy.
1483, 1506-08, 1522-27 (1989) (proposing judicial notice of CPGs as the legal standard of
care).
32. Under some approaches to CPG generation, the CPG must, by definition, reflect
a practice consensus. In other words, there must be a substantial body of people using the
treatment approach and generating favorable outcomes with it. It would be possible, how-
ever, for that body to be confined to a particular geographic locale or type of practice
setting (such as an academic medical community). If there was enough experience with
this treatment approach to conclude with confidence that it is adequately safe and more
cost-effective, it could be incorporated into a CPG that was substantially at odds with
conventional practice across the medical community generally.
33. CPGs differ significantly in this regard from the more traditional Medicare utili-
zation review (UR) protocols that are based upon "professionally developed norms of care,
diagnosis, and treatment based upon typical patterns of practice." See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-
3(a)(6)(A) (1988) (outlining the review standards to be used by peer review organizations
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2. As Evidence of the Practice of a "Respectable Minority"
Some states allow as a medical malpractice defense that
the defendant acted according to the custom of at least a "re-
spectable" (or "reputable") minority of the relevant profes-
sion. 4 In some jurisdictions and under some circumstances,
this approach could pose the same problem as discussed above
with regard to customary practice. That is, the guideline in
question may be so new that virtually no one in the relevant
community yet follows it. However, if this problem were to ex-
ist, it obviously would be of shorter duration than the one
raised regarding customary practice.
3. As Evidence of "Reasonable Prudence"
Adherence to a legitimate CPG could be treated by the
court as evidence of the provider's "reasonable prudence," even
if it were not established that anyone other than the defendant
had yet applied the guideline in actual clinical practice. Some
courts define the physician's legal obligation of due care as rea-
sonable prudence rather than as adherence to professional cus-
tom.3 5 These courts could choose to regard a physician's rea-
soned compliance with a legitimately developed CPG as
meeting the standard of reasonable prudence.
contracting with Medicare). That is, the foundation of Medicare UR protocols was custom-
ary professional practice, as revealed in Medicare claims data.
34. See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-5(a) (1995) (citing cases);
JOSEPH H. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 65-66 (2d ed. 1986). Some courts
have abandoned the respectable minority doctrine out of concern that it is subject to misin-
terpretation and overly liberal application. See, e.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165
(Tex. 1977) (rejecting the respectible minority standard because jurors may think that
standards are determined by polling physicians); Henderson v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 600
S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Hood). A doctrine closely related to the
respectable minority rule is that which recognizes different, or competing, schools of prac-
tice. See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992). This doctrine is not different
enough to call for separate treatment here.
35. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). Helling makes the point
that it is reasonable prudence and not customary practice which should be required, citing
Learned Hand's oft-quoted declaration in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932), cert. denied, Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932):
"[i]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission."
Helling, 519 P.2d at 983.
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4. As Evidence of What the Profession Considers "Accept-
able Practice"
As Professor Joseph King advocates, a court could choose
to regard a treatment approach sanctioned by an appropriate
CPG as "acceptable practice" within the medical community
without considering the number of practitioners who actually
were following this practice at the time in question."8 This ap-
proach would be very similar to direct application of the CPG
as the applicable legal standard, which is discussed next.37 It is
also similar in underlying concept to the notion of "respectable
minority," discussed above.38 If the medical community re-
spects a practice as having been carefully considered and found
acceptable by reputable members of the profession, courts
would not regard the practice as inadequate, regardless of the
number of clinicians who had actually adopted it as of the time
in question. The key to the court's recognition of the CPG as
the legal standard would, in any case, be the medical profes-
sion's acceptance of the CPG as authoritative. Obviously, this
acceptance would depend upon the power and reputation of the
body developing, endorsing, or adopting the CPG.
5. Direct Application as the Legal Standard of Care
The most straightforward and complete acceptance of
CPGs, of course, would be for a court simply to treat the CPG
as defining acceptable practice, adopting it as the legal stan-
dard without going through any intermediate steps based upon
professional adoption or custom. According this recognition to
a CPG could conceivably be achieved through judicial exten-
sion of existing legal doctrine, for example, as a logical extra-
polation from the respectable minority rule. In most jurisdic-
tions, however, giving direct application to CPGs would be a
substantial departure from existing law.39 Thus, elevation of
CPGs to a legal standard could more directly and confidently
36. Joseph H. King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. Rav. 1213, 1236 (1975) (recommending
accepted medical practice over customary medical practice as the standard of care).
37. See infra part VI.A.5.
38. See infra part VI.A.2.
39. See King, supra note 36, at 1235 (citing, inter alia, the classic work of Allan H.
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 605-09
(1959)).
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be achieved through legislative action. Although legislation
might be the simpler route conceptually, it is by no means clear
that it would be feasible as a political matter, since detaching
standard setting from professional consensus has far-reaching
implications. 0
If the CPG were to be adopted as the legal standard, the
question remains how firmly that standard would be applied.
The strongest use would be as a per se standard. Thus, courts
would conclusively (that is, irrebuttably) presume that the pro-
vider was negligent if she or he did not follow the standard and
would conclusively presume that the care was reasonable if she
or he did.4 1 A somewhat weaker approach would be to treat
compliance with a relevant guideline as raising a rebuttable
presumption that the physician acted correctly. The opposing
party could counter this presumption with appropriate evi-
dence.42 Another dimension to the fullness of applying the legal
standard is whether both the plaintiff and the defendant could
use the CPG in court. The recent evolution of applying CPGs
as a legal standard has favored their use only as a defense by
the health care provider. Whether CPGs should be applied in
such an asymmetrical manner will be considered below. 3
Direct application of CPGs as setting the legal standard
for medical care is an extreme recognition that seems inappro-
priate and unlikely at this relatively early stage of development
of CPGs. Public, professional, and judicial confidence in CPGs
would have to be far greater than it is now for the legal system
to accord this much weight to them. Before such confidence
could be gained, many more issues about CPGs, their auspice,
40. For an interesting example of professional reaction to judicial attempts at discon-
necting legal standards from professional custom, and the resulting legal tug-of-war, see
Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
41. This approach is followed in Minnesota. See MNN. STAT. § 62J.34(3)(a) (1994)
(authorizing adherence to approved practice parameters as an absolute defense). See also
infra note 57 and accompanying text.
42. This is the approach contemplated in the Health Equity and Access Reform To-
day (HEART) Act of 1993, which was proposed by Senator John H. Chafee (R., R.I.) and
others. See S. 1770, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 4025 (1993). Under HEART, adherence to
state-developed guidelines that had been certified by the Secretary of HHS would establish
a rebuttable presumption of appropriate care that could be overcome only by "clear and
convincing evidence," a stricter evidentiary standard favoring the party complying with the
guideline. Id. See also S. 223, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1993); S. 314, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. § 501 (1991) (use of guidelines creates rebuttable presumption of reasonable
care).
43. See infra part VI.B.4.
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development, and the like would have to be addressed and sat-
isfactorily resolved. Since these conditions have not been met
yet, the American Medical Association (AMA) now opposes
direct adoption of CPGs as a legal standard. The AMA urges
instead that CPGs be used only as evidence of the customarily
observed professional standard of practice and that their degree
of authority depend on the degree of their acceptance among
medical practitioners.44
B. Factors Affecting the Courts' Treatment of CPGs
The way the courts regard CPGs and apply them in medi-
cal malpractice cases will likely be affected by multiple factors.
The following factors seem the most significant.
1. Who Developed the Guideline in Question? How? And
Why?
The weight to be accorded to a CPG will be affected by its
perceived accuracy and authoritativeness. This perception will
inevitably depend upon the reputation of the developer and
sponsor of the guideline. In large part, the guideline's credibil-
ity will ride the coattails of its source; a "prestigious national
group," such as a respected professional organization, pre-
sumed to have both the technical expertise and objectivity to
know and speak accurately and honestly, will be the most pow-
erful auspice for a CPG.45
Besides its "auspice legitimacy," the guideline can be as-
sessed based on the process by which it was generated and the
motivation underlying its creation. A guideline generated by
scientists of acknowledged competence that shows evidence of
extensive data-gathering and careful analysis and that is ori-
ented toward improving or maintaining quality of care will,
quite naturally, carry more weight than a guideline assembled
from limited data by a little known managed care organization
and intended to support an aggressive cost-containment pro-
gram. While a court could conduct a detailed inquiry into the
process and purpose underlying the creation of a given CPG, it
44. See Hirshfeld, supra note 16, at 323 (discussing the AMA position that a prac-
tice guideline should serve as a source of evidence for the standard of care depending on
how well it is accepted among practicing physicians).
45. Mehlman, supra note 3, at 377 (citing Kinney & Wilder, supra note 29, at 448).
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is likely that the reputation of the sponsor - the auspice legiti-
macy - will become a common proxy for the quality of the
guideline itself. One possibility, of course, is to have guidelines
issued only from a single governmental agency, at either the
federal or state level. This issue is addressed below as part of
the discussion of whether multiple guidelines should be
allowed., 6
2. Is the Guideline "Certified?"
One way to assure the quality of CPGs before according
them legal weight is to have some mechanism for grading them
or screening from the system entirely those of inadequate qual-
ity. Such quality control review would presumably be done by a
governmental body, at either the state or the federal level. If
done at the federal level, the logical candidate is the AHCPR,
which has thus far carried the federal government's charge to
develop the process for generating guidelines. 47 The govern-
mental agency could certify, that is endorse or "bless," the
guideline. Courts could ban the use of uncertified guidelines or,
perhaps more likely, allow their use but accord them a lower
legal status. A certified guideline might be granted "direct ap-
plication" as the legal standard without further inquiry into its
legitimacy; by contrast, an uncertified CPG might be treated in
one of the other ways detailed above - for example, as evi-
dence of the customary practice or the practice of a respectable
minority of medical practitioners.
Certification of a CPG initially upon its issuance would be
only part of the legitimizing protocol. A mechanism also is
needed for periodic updating of the CPG.48 As new evidence
accumulates on the effectiveness of the treatment approach em-
bodied in the CPG and on its merit relative to other emerging
treatment approaches, a mechanism to reassess the guideline
based upon this newly acquired knowledge must be developed.
It would be wrong to have a certified guideline that is out of
46. See infra text at notes 50-53.
47. For an overview of the work on guidelines development done by the AHCPR and
other federal (and private) agencies, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, supra note
8, at 145-47.
48. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 432 (noting that much of the information used to
develop practice parameters quickly becomes outdated); Mehlman, supra note note 3, at
378 (explaining the need to update minimum standards).
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synch with the latest and best confirmed knowledge in the field.
Moreover, allowing a guideline to stay in place and according it
legal weight after medical knowledge had advanced signifi-
cantly would tend to freeze the state of the medical art. As
Edward Hirshfeld states the position of the AMA, "Out of re-
spect for the evolution of medicine, the AMA is concerned that
making a set of practice guidelines mandatory standards of
care would stifle innovation and the dissemination of medical
advances."4 9
3. Is There a Single Guideline or Are There Multiple
Guidelines?
Another key factor affecting the weight a court might ac-
cord to a CPG is whether it is the only relevant guideline rec-
ognized. If so, it almost certainly would receive greater weight
than if there were multiple guidelines that differed on one or
more material and relevant points. While parts of the above
analysis implicitly presume a unitary system with only a single
guideline covering each condition, illness, or treatment, many
commentators favor a pluralistic approach allowing multiple
guidelines issued by different auspices.50 However, a pluralistic
system allowing alternative, conflicting guidelines is inherently
untidy and undoubtedly would complicate matters by inviting
controversy over which guideline should be regarded as author-
itative, or more authoritative. Instead of the traditional "battle
of the experts" in medical malpractice cases, there would be a
"battle of the guidelines." Perhaps this would lead to better,
more confident judicial decisionmaking; perhaps it just would
lead to more confusion.51
49. Hirshfeld, supra note 16, at 324.
50. See, e.g., id. at 325-26 (recommending the use of states as testing grounds). Pro-
fessor Havighurst, true to his hallmark advocacy of approaches allowing consumer choice,
also supports a pluralistic approach. See Clark C. Havighurst, Medical Practice Guidelines
as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 87, 113
(1991).
51. See Arnold J. Rosoff, A Response to the (ABA) Policy Subcommittee and James
Rosenblum, NEwsL OF THE TORT AND INS. PRAC. SEC. MED. & L. COMM. (ABA), Spring
1991, at 20. In this point-counterpoint exchange, attorney James Rosenblum argued that
the wider use of guidelines would escalate the difficulty of proving medical negligence and
encumber the courts. See Practice Parameters/Practice Guidelines: From the Operating
Room to the Courtroom, NEWSL. OF THE TORT AND INS. PRAC. SEC. MED. & L. COMM.
(ABA), Spring 1991, at 16, 17-20. Professor Rosoff countered that greater reliance on
[Vol. 5:369
1995] THE ROLE OF CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES 387
Whatever the implications for judicial efficiency, adopting
a unitary, or monopolistic, system for CPGs will centralize
power in a single body, whether governmental or private, and
impede innovation in clinical practice. Pluralism is very much
the American tradition owing to an abiding belief that compe-
tition in goods, services, and ideas will bring about the best of
each for the greater benefit of the society. Absent compelling
evidence that a pluralistic approach is not workable in the case
of CPGs, this approach should be preferable.
A key issue that will have to be addressed if multiple
guidelines are allowed is how a court should determine whether
a guideline is authoritative enough to be admissible as evidence
and, if admissible, whether and how to assess the relative
weight to be accorded to competing guidelines. Several ap-
proaches are possible. First, as noted above, the court could al-
low only guidelines developed by a recognized professional
body, using what might be termed "auspice validation." 52 Sec-
ond, it could seek to determine the extent that the guidelines in
contention had been adopted, according greater weight to the
guideline more widely followed. 53 This approach might be
called "use validation." The search to discover which guideline
was more "popular" could be an undertaking of substantial dif-
ficulty and questionable value. A desire to avoid such inquiry
may have been a significant factor in the development of the
"respectable minority" and "different schools of thought" doc-
trines. Finally, the court could inquire into how the guideline
was developed, including the ongoing process for periodic up-
dating and revision. This approach might be termed "process
validation." Each approach has its advantages and its obvious
drawbacks.
Many of these issues could be avoided if the court recog-
nized as admissible only those guidelines that had undergone a
reliable review process and had been certified. In such case, the
court's job would not be to decide whether the defendant fol-
lowed the best guideline but, instead, whether she or he fol-
lowed an acceptable guideline. This method has much in com-
guidelines would ease the courts' burden of determining what was an acceptable standard
of care. Rosoff, supra, at 20.
52. See supra part VI.B.1.
53. Presumably, the party offering the CPG would have the burden of showing how
widely it was used.
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mon conceptually with the "respectable minority" and "schools
of thought" doctrines. In practical effect, all certified guidelines
would be on an equal footing legally, and a defendant would be
deemed to have acted reasonably by following any one of them
(assuming that the situation in question fell within the appro-
priate reach of the guideline followed).
4. Who is Asserting the Guideline in Court and for What
Reason?
A final element affecting how a court would treat a CPG
in a given case is who is asserting the guideline, the plaintiff or
defendant, and for what purpose? Will it be equally available
to both the plaintiff and the defendant? Development of the
guidelines movement in the 1990s suggests that the legal appli-
cation of CPGs will be asymmetrical. Health care provider de-
fendants will be able to introduce CPGs to prove their practice
was adequate in that it satisfied the guideline (used as a
"shield"); but they will not be available to the plaintiff to show
that the defendant(s) did not live up to the standard articulated
by the guideline (used as a "sword"). 5" The principal example
of this uneven application is the widely discussed 1990 Maine
Medical Malpractice Demonstration Project, 55 which set up a
five-year experiment apparently allowing shield use of guide-
lines by physicians while prohibiting sword use by patient-
plaintiffs. 6 Some other states, notably Minnesota, are also tak-
54. See Paul McGinn, Practice Standards: MDs" Shield or Plaintiffs' Spear?, AM.
MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1989, at 21.
55. ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 2972(1) (West Supp. 1994). See generally GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OmcE, GAO/HRD-94-8, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE'S USE OF
PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS (1993) (describing the Maine demonstration);
Stephen J. Schanz, The Emerging Status of Practice Parameters, MED. STAFF COUNS.,
Fall 1993, at 31 (noting that Maine allows physicians to use practice parameters as an
affirmative defense, while plaintiffs may use them as evidence only in limited
circumstances).
56. Although this distinction was the clear intent of the legislation, some have raised
doubts about whether it would actually have this effect in practice. Bob Stolt, who opposed
the guidelines experiment for the Maine Trial Lawyers Association when it was before the
legislature, predicts courts will allow both sides to introduce guidelines in malpractice liti-
gation. Professional Liability: Maine's Experiment with Practice Guidelines Produces Lit-
tle Evidence, 3 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 753, 754 (June 9, 1994) [hereinafter Maine's
Experiment].
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ing this tack,57 as did the Clinton administration's late, largely
unlamented, health system reform proposal.58
This kind of uneven application has come about basically
as a political barter, with proponents of guidelines saying, in
effect, "If you doctors will support the development and adop-
tion of guidelines, we will see that they cannot be used against
you."59 Whether such protection is needed is far from clear.
Experts have considered both the inculpatory and exculpatory
potential of practice guidelines without conclusion or consensus
as to which side they are most likely to favor.8 0 My personal
belief is that, even absent any rule explicitly limiting their use
by plaintiffs, guidelines more often will be helpful to the de-
fendant. Still, it seems clear that assuring providers that using
guidelines will be skewed in their favor was an important factor
in gaining their support. But providing by statute for asymmet-
rical application of guidelines - that is, allowing "shield" use
but not "sword" use - raises disturbing questions of fairness.
To put it simply, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander. If a court will treat a guideline as an authoritative
statement of what is appropriate medical care in a given situa-
tion, why should not the failure of a physician to follow that
guideline be taken as evidence of inappropriate care? Not only
does one-sided application make the malpractice litigation
playing field uneven; it also may be grounds for federal consti-
tutional challenges under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' requirements of "equal protection of the laws, and per-
haps under state constitutional principles as well."8 1
To date, no such challenges have been mounted. Reflecting
the fact that Maine has relatively few physicians and a small
volume of medical malpractice litigation generally, there have
been no suits involving the use of the guidelines since the law
57. MiNN. STAT. § 62J.34(3)(a) (1994) (providing an absolute defense for provid-
ers). Florida and Vermont also have adopted this approach, and several other states - e.g.,
Colorado, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Hawaii - also have considered or are
considering adoption of guidelines legislation. Maine's Experiment, supra note 56, at 753;
Schanz, supra note 55, at 33-34.
58. See H.R. 4469, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 441 (1994).
59. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OmcE, supra note 55, at 26-27.
60. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 3, at 76-78; Hall, supra note 13, at 129-32; Havig-
hurst, supra note 50, at 105; Legal Beat: Doctors' Own Guidelines Hurt Them in Court,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1994, at Bl.
61. Mehlman, supra note 3, at 378. But see Hirshfeld, supra note 1, at 2889-90
(providing arguments against the unconstitutionality of asymmetric application).
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took effect in January 1992.62 Other evidence of their impact
- for example, a reduction of health care costs reflecting a
lesser incidence of defensive medical practice - is inconclu-
sive, despite reports that doctors are performing fewer medical
procedures prompted by legal considerations. The state's insur-
ance superintendent has estimated that the demonstration pro-
ject resulted in a 0.5 % savings in malpractice premiums state-
wide, 3 but as yet there is no hard data to support this
projection. The Maine official overseeing the project, Dr. Ed-
ward David, chairman of the state's Board of Registration in
Medicine, concedes that in a small state like Maine, five years
may not be long enough to evaluate the program's effectiveness,
and the program may never be able to prove a reduction in the
cost of medical care or of malpractice litigation.64 Physicians in
the four specialties originally targeted by the legislation, anes-
thesiology, emergency medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, and
radiology have been supportive of the project. However, other
specialties have not taken advantage of a 1993 legislative
amendment to expand the project into their areas of practice,
and there has been no move to extend it beyond its originally
authorized five-year term. 5
C. How Will the Use of CPGs Affect Malpractice
Litigation?
Whatever the mechanism by which they feed into court
determinations, guidelines could reduce the volume and com-
plexity (and thus the cost) of malpractice litigation. In the first
place, one would hope this might occur by reducing the inci-
dence of the actual, underlying malpractice. Better care will
mean fewer people harmed, which in turn will mean less cause
for suits. Second, anything that makes the decision process
more rational and thus makes the outcome of litigation easier
to predict will increase the likelihood of dismissal or settlement
of suits before trial. Third, for those suits going to trial, the
application of CPGs should greatly facilitate determining
62. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 55, at 19; Maine's Experiment,
supra note 56, at 753.
63. Maine's Experiment, supra note 56, at 753.
64. Id. at 754.
65. See id. at 753 (noting that the process to write and to evaluate guidelines makes
the timeframe impractical).
390 [Vol. 5:369
1995] THE ROLE OF CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES 391
whether a given treatment approach is medically, and thus le-
gally, acceptable.
Clearly, however, judicial recognition of guidelines, even
according them great weight, will still leave many issues to liti-
gate when one sues upon a claim of harm caused by negligent
medical care. These issues include, but are not limited to, the
following: Was the guideline followed the appropriate one for
the given situation? Did the provider, as a factual matter, actu-
ally follow the guideline? If the guideline allowed latitude for
discretion in treating the patient, did the provider exercise that
discretion in an appropriate and acceptable manner? If any of
these three questions is answered in the negative, was that the
cause of the patient's damage? Although the first three ques-
tions go to the existence vel non of negligence, this fourth ques-
tion raises the essential requirement of proving causation, that
is, that the negligence caused the injury(ies) suffered. A related
question is how responsibility should be allocated if multiple
parties were implicated in the negligent care of the patient.
Questions also will remain as to the nature and extent of the
plaintiff's injuries and the proper amount of damages to be
awarded. If multiple defendants are involved, the question of
how to allocate responsibility among them also will arise.
The above listing is not exhaustive, but it should suffice to
avert any niive assumption that guidelines will be a panacea
for the many difficulties of malpractice litigation. Whatever re-
gime the law creates, disputes inevitably will arise in trying to
live under that regime. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to work
toward establishing a more rational set of rules; surely the is-
sues to be addressed will be fewer and more readily soluble
under such conditions. Moreover, even if there were no signifi-
cant legal system advantages to be gained from expanding the
use of CPGs, the health care system advantages are sufficiently
great to justify the quest for the best way to incorporate CPGs
into the law.
VII. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF GUIDELINES
DEVELOPERS AND ISSUERS
Among the many issues raised by the practice guidelines
movement, there is another that deserves mention here, al-
though it is outside the focus of this Article. It is the potential
for liability of the guideline developers and issuers. The ques-
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tion has intrigued both scholars and practitioners, and it will
certainly affect the zeal with which various parties participate
in the development and sponsorship of CPGs.
As guidelines take on greater importance in health care
policy and practice and their development becomes big busi-
ness, the pressure will grow to hold accountable those who reap
large gains from an activity that bears strongly on the public
health. One obvious basis for liability would be negligence in
analyzing the outcomes research data or translating it into
clinical recommendations. Another would be using data that
the developer knew, or should have known, were inaccurate or
insufficient. Beyond mere negligence, a court might find a lack
of good faith, supporting the award of punitive damages, in
representing that a given test or procedure can safely be omit-
ted when the data and analysis do not adequately support that
conclusion. This result would be most likely and most justified
when the guideline's developer was an organization, such as an
HMO or managed care company, that would stand to gain di-
rectly by an unjustifiably parsimonious or corner-cutting stan-
dard. As important as cost-containment may be, the safety and
well-being of patients must be the prime objective in guidelines
development.
Another basis for negligence liability could be the CPG
developer's failure to keep its guidelines continually updated
and replace obsolete standards as technology and knowledge
move forward. 6 This ground is particularly appropriate for at
least two reasons. First, since the function of guidelines is to
synthesize and disseminate the state of the medical art, their
issuers have a special obligation to stay abreast of new develop-
ments. Indeed, if they market their services as being on the
"cutting edge" of medical knowledge, or as advancing the state
of the art, such claims could easily be taken for a contractual
undertaking, or warranty, to constantly reassess, and revise
where necessary, their informational product. Second, once a
guideline is issued and substantial numbers of providers start
66. Some recent cases, e.g., Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177
(D.C. 1990), have required providers to adopt new devices rapidly to keep pace with the
advancing state of technology. Presumably, adoption of new knowledge would be pushed
even more aggressively, since no capital investment is required. See Burton v. Brooklyn
Doctors Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding a hospital and physi-
cians liable for not following new treatment studies that contravened conventional wisdom).
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following it, much more data will become available on the
clinical experience under its recommended treatment approach.
The disseminator of the guideline then will have a unique abil-
ity to follow up and assess the validity of the guideline. With
special access to critical information might well come the cor-
responding obligation to make effective use of that information.
Legal recognition of this special obligation would assure the
creation and operation of mechanisms for using this new data
to validate, or invalidate, the guideline.
But liability is not a certainty. In his 1991 article,6 7 Pro-
fessor Brennan offers four main reasons why there is little like-
lihood of a successful suit against those who issue guidelines.
First, courts tend to place primary responsibility for the care of
the patient on the physician rather than on others involved in a
less direct way with treatment decisions.68 Second, recognizing
that guideline developers are undertaking a complex pioneering
activity for the benefit of the public, courts would not want to
chill their activity. Third, when guidelines are essentially a
compilation of existing literature, they would provide only nar-
row grounds for a suit. Brennan notes that he is not aware of
any suits against the author of a review article on the ground
that she or he failed to consider all aspects of a particular ques-
tion. However, he acknowledges that the situation may be dif-
ferent when "the guidelines represent new data derived from an
explicit consensus-building effort within a group of experts."6 9
Finally, when the guideline developer is a governmental body, a
sovereign immunity might apply.
67. Brennan, supra note 3, at 78-80.
68. Id. at 78. Although it was dictum in the specific context of that case, the court in
Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), expressed a broadly held
sentiment:
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a
third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his
ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot point to the health care
payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative
medical decisions go sour.
Id. at 819.
69. Brennan, supra note 3, at 79.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND A POLICY "TRIAL
BALLOON"
This Article has attempted just an overview, not a compre-
hensive exposition, of the legal issues surrounding the Clinical
Practice Guidelines movement. Much more exploration could
and should be applied to each of the issues raised above. Ab-
sent such in-depth analysis, it is arguably inappropriate to draw
conclusions or make policy pronouncements; but, in the interest
of provoking further debate and inquiry, I would like to close
by proposing some guiding principles and a set of specific
recommendations.
Further development of the Clinical Practice Guidelines
movement holds great promise for improving the nation's
health care system, with regard both to cost and quality. I
favor CPGs and would like to see their use and authority con-
tinue to grow. In supporting this growth, the following four es-
sential principles should be observed. First, private sector ini-
tiatives should be relied upon to the fullest extent practicable;
government involvement in setting standards for medical prac-
tice should not be increased beyond what is necessary to assure
the safe and sensible development and application of CPGs.
Second, guidelines must not be allowed to freeze, or even chill,
the advance of medical knowledge and practice. There must be
ample latitude for the introduction of new technologies and
clinical approaches. By the same token, there must be room for
the development of new guidelines and provision for the contin-
ual updating and revision of existing guidelines. Third, mal-
practice litigation processes should be streamlined and simpli-
fied to the greatest extent practicable through the adoption of
CPGs. At the least, CPGs should be added to the legal land-
scape in a way that causes no disruption of judicial processes or
escalation of their complexity. Finally, parties to medical mal-
practice litigation should be treated fairly and even-handedly.
CPGs should not be used in a way that gives either plaintiffs or
defendants undue advantage.
Working from a belief that the development and use of
CPGs offers substantial benefits and should be encouraged at
the national level, and consistent with the general principles ar-
ticulated above, I propose the following specific elements for a
national program to foster the development and widespread use
of clinical practice guidelines.
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-A pluralistic system should be adopted; that is, all interested
and qualified parties should be allowed to develop and promote
the use of their CPGs. However, a clear legal distinction should
be drawn between certified and uncertified CPGs, creating an
incentive for voluntary compliance with a federal program of
quality assurance for guidelines development and use.
-A federal agency, either AHCPR or another appropriate sub-
unit of the DHHS, should be designated by congressional. legis-
lation as the sole agency to certify ("bless") CPGs. The reason-
able costs of initial certification and periodic recertification
should be borne by the entity issuing the CPG. General costs
related to AHCPR's activities as the certifying agency should
be borne by the HHS budget.
*To be certified, a CPG must be developed: (1) through solid,
scientific outcomes research, using an appropriate and ade-
quately large clinical practice data base; (2) using appropriate
methodology, as defined by DHHS regulations; (3) with input
from qualified medical professionals, and (4) with provision for
prompt, periodic updating to incorporate experience gained
through clinical practice under the CPG.
-The legislation establishing the certification process also
should direct federal and state courts to recognize a CPG as
establishing an "acceptable standard" of health care only if the
CPG has been certified by the designated government agency
and its requirements for periodic updating and ongoing recer-
tification of the CPG have been met.
*CPGs should be available equally to plaintiffs and defendants
for use in malpractice litigation. While the substantive rules of
liability for medical negligence may make CPGs more useful to
one party than the other, there should be no inequality of treat-
ment under procedural or evidentiary rules. The principle of
equal treatment would not preclude a rule that compliance
with a recognized guideline creates a rebuttable presumption
that the health care provider used reasonable care in the treat-
ment of the patient.
-An issuer of a CPG should be immune from civil liability for
harms caused by the adoption and use of the CPG if the initial
and ongoing federal certification requirements have been met.
Liability protection for the certifying body itself (presumably
AHCPR) would be through sovereign immunity.
If the above general principles can be observed and a na-
tional framework of federal and state laws developed along the
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specific lines proposed, the use of clinical practice guidelines
will bring substantial benefits to our health care system. While
there will always be a need and a place for professional medical
judgment, it is wise to make maximum use of available empiri-
cal evidence of what works and does not work, synthesizing
those data into carefully analyzed, widely disseminated guide-
lines to assist physicians in the application of their judgment.
Benefits to the legal system will flow from this as well, making
possible more accurate, efficient, timely, and affordable resolu-
tion of disputes about the quality and appropriateness of health
care provided.
